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Give an example of the Best Response Correspondences of the 2 players in a 2x2 matrix...

Give an example of the Best Response Correspondences of the 2 players in a 2x2 matrix game where [(0,1);(0,1)] and [(0.5,0.5);(0.5,0.5)] are Nash equilibria.  

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