Question

1.Both firms in a Cournot duopoly would enjoy lower profits if: Multiple Choice one firm reduced...

1.Both firms in a Cournot duopoly would enjoy lower profits if:

Multiple Choice
one firm reduced output below the Cournot Nash equilibrium level, while the other firm continued to produce its Cournot Nash equilibrium output.
None of the answers is correct.
each firm simultaneously increased output above the Nash equilibrium level.
the firms simultaneously reduced output below the Nash equilibrium level.

2.Both firms in a Cournot duopoly would enjoy higher profits if:


Multiple Choice
the firms simultaneously reduced output below the Nash equilibrium level and one firm reduced output below the Cournot Nash equilibrium level, while the other firm continued to produce its Cournot Nash equilibrium output.
one firm reduced output below the Cournot Nash equilibrium level, while the other firm continued to produce its Cournot Nash equilibrium output.
the firms simultaneously reduced output below the Nash equilibrium level.
each firm simultaneously increased output above the Nash equilibrium level.

Homework Answers

Know the answer?
Your Answer:

Post as a guest

Your Name:

What's your source?

Earn Coins

Coins can be redeemed for fabulous gifts.

Not the answer you're looking for?
Ask your own homework help question
Similar Questions
Consider a duopoly with two firms with the cost functions: Firm 1: C1(q1)=5q1 Firm 2: C2(q2)=5q2...
Consider a duopoly with two firms with the cost functions: Firm 1: C1(q1)=5q1 Firm 2: C2(q2)=5q2 The firms compete in a market with inverse demand p = 300 - 8Q where Q=q1+q2. The firms compete in a Cournot fashion by choosing output simultaneously.   What is the Nash-Cournot equilibrium output of firm 1? Round to nearest .1
Cournot Model: Consider a duopoly where 2 firms produce a homogeneous product. Under the assumption that...
Cournot Model: Consider a duopoly where 2 firms produce a homogeneous product. Under the assumption that one firm’s decision on output would depend on the other firm’s output, a market demand is given as P = 90 - Q where Q = QA + QB (QA is the quantity of a firm A and QB is the quantity of a firm B). Find the quantity and the price in this duopoly when MC of both firms = 0.
Two firms, firm 1 & firm 2, in a Stackelberg sequential duopoly are facing the market...
Two firms, firm 1 & firm 2, in a Stackelberg sequential duopoly are facing the market demand given by P = 140 – 0.4Q, where P is the market price and Q is the market quantity demanded. Firm 1 has (total) cost of production given by C(q1) = 200 + 15q1, where q1 is the quantity produced by firm 1. Firm 2 has (total) cost of production given by C(q2) = 200 + 10q2, where q2 is the quantity produced...
Consider two firms, Firm A and Firm B, who compete as duopolists. Each firm produces an...
Consider two firms, Firm A and Firm B, who compete as duopolists. Each firm produces an identical product. The total inverse demand curve for the industry is ? = 250 − (?? + ?? ). Firm A has a total cost curve ?? (?? ) = 100 + ?? 2 . Firm B has a total cost curve ?? (?? ) = 100 + 2??. a. Suppose for now, only Firm A exists (?? = 0). What is the Monopoly...
Two Cournot firms produce slightly different products. Product prices depend on both firms' outputs and are...
Two Cournot firms produce slightly different products. Product prices depend on both firms' outputs and are determined by the following equations P1 = 70 - 2Q1 - Q2, P2 = 100 - Q1- 2Q2. Both Firm 1 and Firm 2 have constant marginal cost of $10 and zero fixed cost. Firm 1 chooses Q1 and Firm 2 chooses Q2. (3pts) Find Firm 1's best response as a function of Firm 2's output Q2.   (3pts) Find Firm 2's best response as...
Consider the infinitely repeated version of the Cournot duopoly model where price in the market is...
Consider the infinitely repeated version of the Cournot duopoly model where price in the market is given by P = 100 – Q for Q= q1 + q2 and marginal cost of production for both firms is given by c= 10. a) What is the Nash equilibrium of the static game? What is the profit of each firm? b) If there was only one firm in the market, and P = 100-q1, what is the static monopoly optimum? What is...
An industry producing a homogeneous commodity is comprised of N(≥ 2) firms. Assume that each firm...
An industry producing a homogeneous commodity is comprised of N(≥ 2) firms. Assume that each firm faces a marginal cost of 1 and no other costs. The industry inverse demand function is P(Q) = 11 − Q, where Q is industry output. (a) Assuming that the firms choose quantities simultaneously, derive the profits of each firm in equilibrium. (b) Two of the firms are considering a merger. A merger simply means that these two firms become one firm, with the...
A homogenous good industry consists of two identical firms (firm 1 and firm 2). Both firms...
A homogenous good industry consists of two identical firms (firm 1 and firm 2). Both firms have a constant average total cost and marginal cost of $4 per unit. The demand curve is given by P = 10 – Q. Suppose the two firms choose their quantities simultaneously as in the Cournot model. (1) Find and plot each firm’s best-response curve. (Be sure to clearly label your curves, axes and intercepts.) (2) Find each firm’s quantity and profit in the...
There is a Cournot game consisting of two different firms that produce the same goods. Quantity...
There is a Cournot game consisting of two different firms that produce the same goods. Quantity produced by firm one = q Quantity produced by firm two = q2 The marginal cost for firm one equals average cost, which is 3. The marginal cost for firm two equals average cost, which is 4. The formula for the inverse demand curve of the market is P = 70 - (q1 +q2). Answer the following questions with work: 1. What is the...
Consider a duopoly with a Cournot competition. The demand of the market is Q=2-p. Both firm...
Consider a duopoly with a Cournot competition. The demand of the market is Q=2-p. Both firm 1 and firm 2’s marginal costs can take two values. For firm 1 it can be MC=5/4 with probability 1/3 and MC=3/4 with probability 2/3. For firm 2 it can be MC=5/4 with probability 2/3 and MC=3/4 with probability 1/3. Each firm knows its own MC but does not know the MC of the other firm. (But the probabilities are known to everyone.) What...
ADVERTISEMENT
Need Online Homework Help?

Get Answers For Free
Most questions answered within 1 hours.

Ask a Question
ADVERTISEMENT