Question

Cournot Model: Consider a duopoly where 2 firms produce a homogeneous product. Under the assumption that...

Cournot Model: Consider a duopoly where 2 firms produce a homogeneous product. Under the assumption that one firm’s decision on output would depend on the other firm’s output, a market demand is given as P = 90 - Q where Q = QA + QB (QA is the quantity of a firm A and QB is the quantity of a firm B).

Find the quantity and the price in this duopoly when MC of both firms = 0.

Homework Answers

Answer #1

In this case MCA=MCB=0

P=90-Q

where Q=QA+QB

P=90-QA-QB

Let us consider the case of firm A

Profit of firm A=P*QA-MCA*QA

PRA=(90-QA-QB)*QA-0*QA=90QA-QA2-QAQB

For profit maximization, take derivative of PRA with respect to QA and equate it to zero

d(PRA)/dQA=90-2QA-QB=0

2QA=90-QB

QA=45-0.5QB -------------------------(1)

Now consider the case of firm B

Profit of firm B=P*QB-MCB*QB

PRB=(90-QA-QB)*QB-0*QB=90QB-QB2-QAQB

For profit maximization, take derivative of PRB with respect to QB and equate it to zero

d(PRB)/dQB=90-2QB-QA=0

2QB=90-QA

Put QA=45-0.5QB

2QB=90-45+0.5QB

1.5QB=45

QB=30

So,

QA= 45-0.5QB=45-0.5*30=30

Total Output =30+30=60 units (Where output of each firm is 30 units)

P=90-QA-QB=90-30-30=$30

Know the answer?
Your Answer:

Post as a guest

Your Name:

What's your source?

Earn Coins

Coins can be redeemed for fabulous gifts.

Not the answer you're looking for?
Ask your own homework help question
Similar Questions
1. Consider a Cournot duopoly model with two firms, 1 and 2, selling the same product...
1. Consider a Cournot duopoly model with two firms, 1 and 2, selling the same product and facing the inverse market demand p(Q) = 270 - 4Q, where Q is the total quantity sold in the market. The firms have the same constant marginal cost c = 30. The firms simultaneously and independently decide how much to sell. (e) Suppose the two firms for a cartel and agree to maximizes total profit and divide it equally. Find the each firm’s...
Consider a market with 2 identical firms (a and b). The market demand is P =...
Consider a market with 2 identical firms (a and b). The market demand is P = 14 - Q where Q = Qa + Qb. For both firms AC=MC= 2. A. Solve for the Cournot-Nash reaction functions of each firm. B. Solve for the Cournot- Nash equilibrium. Solve for Q, Qa, Qb, Price, and each firms profit. C. Compare the Cournot-Nash equilibrium with perfect competition, and monopoly (you can refer to your results from question 2, if you’ve already done...
Consider a market with 2 identical firms (a and b). The market demand is P =...
Consider a market with 2 identical firms (a and b). The market demand is P = 14 - Q where Q = Qa + Qb. For both firms AC=MC= 2. A. Solve for the Cournot-Nash reaction functions of each firm. B. Solve for the Cournot- Nash equilibrium. Solve for Q, Qa, Qb, Price, and each firms profit. C. Compare the Cournot-Nash equilibrium with perfect competition, and monopoly (you can refer to your results from question 2, if you’ve already done...
Consider the Cournot duopoly model where the inverse demand is P(Q) = a – Q but...
Consider the Cournot duopoly model where the inverse demand is P(Q) = a – Q but firms have asymmetric marginal costs: c1 for firm 1 and c2 for firm 2. What is the Nash equilibrium if 0 < ci < a/2 for each firm? What if c1 < c2 < a, but 2c2 > a + c1?
3. Cournot model: Quantity competition in simultaneous move homogeneous product duopolyó explain in words. The market...
3. Cournot model: Quantity competition in simultaneous move homogeneous product duopolyó explain in words. The market for bricks consists of two firms that produce identical products. Competition in the market is such that each of the firms simultaneously and independently produces a quantity of output, and these quantities are then sold in the market at a price that is determined by the total amount produced by the two firms. Firm 2 has a patented technology that provides it with a...
2. Question 2 (50 marks) Consider two firms (A and B) engaging in Cournot Competition. Both...
2. Question 2 Consider two firms (A and B) engaging in Cournot Competition. Both firms face an inverse market demand curve P(Q)=700-5Q, where Q=qA+qB. The marginal revenue curve for firm A is MRA=700-10qA-5qB and the marginal revenue curve for firm B is MRB=700-10qB-5qA. The firms have identical cost functions, with constant marginal cost MC=20. A) Determine the profit function for firm A and firm B. B) Solve for the best-response functions of both firms. C) Determine the equilibrium quantities both...
A homogeneous product duopoly faces a market demand function given by ? = 100 − 0,5?...
A homogeneous product duopoly faces a market demand function given by ? = 100 − 0,5? ? = ?! + ?! a. According to Cournot oligopoly model what would be equilibrium price of market and what would be output levels that maximizes profits of both firms with given cost functions. ?! = 5?! ?! = 0,5?! b. If the firms agreed to make a collusion and set a higher price as if they are monopoly. What would be market price,...
Consider a Cournot model of a duopoly where Firm ?? and Firm ?? operate with asymmetric...
Consider a Cournot model of a duopoly where Firm ?? and Firm ?? operate with asymmetric costs. The inverse market demand function is ?? = ?? ???, the marginal cost of Firm ?? is zero, the marginal cost of Firm ?? is ??, and we impose ?? > ?? > 0 and ?? > 2??. The market output ?? is equal to ???? +????, where ???? and ???? are the output levels of Firms ?? and ??, respectively. There are...
Consider the infinitely repeated version of the Cournot duopoly model where price in the market is...
Consider the infinitely repeated version of the Cournot duopoly model where price in the market is given by P = 100 – Q for Q= q1 + q2 and marginal cost of production for both firms is given by c= 10. a) What is the Nash equilibrium of the static game? What is the profit of each firm? b) If there was only one firm in the market, and P = 100-q1, what is the static monopoly optimum? What is...
Consider a market with demand p = a − bq. There are two firms. Both firms...
Consider a market with demand p = a − bq. There are two firms. Both firms produce the same homogeneous product but have different technologies. Firm A has a cost function cA(qA) = cA × qA and firm B has a cost function cB(qB) = cB × qB. If necessary, assume that cA < cB. (a) Find the equilibrium quantities produced by each firm, the total equilibrium quantity, and the equilibrium price as a function of a, b, cA, and...
ADVERTISEMENT
Need Online Homework Help?

Get Answers For Free
Most questions answered within 1 hours.

Ask a Question
ADVERTISEMENT