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Find a Nash Equilibrium of the second price sealed bid auction that is different from [v1,...

Find a Nash Equilibrium of the second price sealed bid auction that is different from [v1, v2, 0, ....0]

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Answer #1

Another Nash equilibrium will be where everyone is declaring their true value. So, the strategy will be [v1,v2,v3,....,vn]

Our claim is that it is a weakly dominant strategy for each of the players.

Proof of the claim -

Thus, it is another Nash equilibrium.

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