Question

A second-price sealed-bid auction is an auction in which every bidder submits his or her bid...

A second-price sealed-bid auction is an auction in which every bidder submits his or her bid to the auctioneer, the auctioneer announces the winner to be the bidder who submits the highest bid, and the winner pays the highest bid among the losers. Is the following statement True, False, or Uncertain? Explain why. Every player has a weakly dominant strategy in second-price auction.

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Answer #1

The statement is true

Reason

If everyone bids their valuation for that object, it will be a weakly dominant strategy for them. The proof is as follows -

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