Question

Consider 45 risk-neutral bidders who are participating in a second-price, sealed-bid auction. It is commonly known...

Consider 45 risk-neutral bidders who are participating in a second-price, sealed-bid auction. It is commonly known that bidders have independent private values. Based on this information, we know the optimal bidding strategy for each bidder is to:

A. bid their own valuation of the item.

B. shade their bid to just below their own valuation.

C. bid according to the following bid function: b = v − (v − L)/n.

D. bid one penny above their own valuation to ensure they get the item.

Business   Economics   
0 0
Add a commentTranscribed image text
Next >

Homework Answers

Answer #1

0 0
Know the answer?
Your Answer:

Post as a guest

Your Name:

What's your source?

Earn Coins

Coins can be redeemed for fabulous gifts.

Log In

Sign Up

Not the answer you're looking for?
Ask your own homework help question
Similar Questions
You are a bidder in an independent private values auction. Each bidder perceives that valuations are...
You are a bidder in an independent private values auction. Each bidder perceives that valuations are evenly distributed between $100 and $1,000. If there is a total of three bidders and your own valuation of the item is $900, describe your strategy (how you would behave) and your optimal bidding in: a. A first-price, sealed-bid auction. b. A Dutch auction. c. A second-price, sealed-bid auction. d. An English auction. Explain and/or show your work.
You are a bidder in an independent private values auction, and you value the object at...
You are a bidder in an independent private values auction, and you value the object at $5,500. Each bidder perceives that valuations are uniformly distributed between $1,000 and $9,000. Determine your optimal bidding strategy in a first-price, sealed-bid auction when the total number of bidders (including you) is: a. 2 bidders. Bid: $______ b. 10 bidders. Bid: $______ c. 100 bidders. Bid: $______
You are a bidder in an independent private values auction, and you value the object at...
You are a bidder in an independent private values auction, and you value the object at $4,000. Each bidder perceives that valuations are uniformly distributed between $1,000 and $7,000. Determine your optimal bidding strategy in a first-price, sealed-bid auction when the total number of bidders (including you) is: a. 2 bidders. Bid: $ _______ b. 10 bidders. Bid: $ _______ c. 100 bidders. Bid: $_______
4. You are a bidder in an independent private values auction, and you value the object...
4. You are a bidder in an independent private values auction, and you value the object at $3,500. Each bidder perceives that valuations are uniformly distributed between $500 and $7,000. Determine your optimal bidding strategy in a first-price, sealed-bid auction when the total number of bidders (including you) is: a. 2 bidders. Bid: $ b. 10 bidders. Bid: $ c. 100 bidders. Bid: $
Consider an auction where n identical objects are offered, and there are {n + 1) bidders....
Consider an auction where n identical objects are offered, and there are {n + 1) bidders. The actual value of an object is the same for all bidders and equal for all objects, but each bidder gets only an independent estimate, subject to error, of this common value. The bidders submit sealed bids. The top n bidders get one object each, and each pays the next highest bid. What considerations will affect your bidding strategy? How?
Consider an auction where n identical objects are offered and there are n+ 1 bidders. The...
Consider an auction where n identical objects are offered and there are n+ 1 bidders. The true value of each object is the same for all bidders and for all objects but each bidder gets only an independent unbiased estimate of this common value. Bidders submit sealed bids and the top n bidders get one object each and each pays her own bid. Suppose you lose. What conclusion might you draw from losing? How will this affect your bidding strategy?...
Consider a 1st-Price Sealed-Bid auction: all players submit sealed bids, and the object is awarded to...
Consider a 1st-Price Sealed-Bid auction: all players submit sealed bids, and the object is awarded to the highest bidder who pays his/her bid. Is bidding one’s true willingnessto-pay still a dominant strategy?
Consider a first-price sealed-bid auction as the one analyzed in class. Suppose bidders' valuations are v1=10...
Consider a first-price sealed-bid auction as the one analyzed in class. Suppose bidders' valuations are v1=10 and v2=10. Suppose bidder 2 submits a bid b2=10. Then, in a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies bidder 1 must be submitting a bid equal to __ . In this Nash equilibrium, bidder 1's payoff is equal to __ (please, enter numerical values only, for example: 4).
Consider a first-price sealed-bid auction. Suppose bidders' valuations are v1=10 and v2=10. Suppose bidder 2 submits...
Consider a first-price sealed-bid auction. Suppose bidders' valuations are v1=10 and v2=10. Suppose bidder 2 submits a bid b2=10. Then, in a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies bidder 1 must be submitting a bid equal to ______. In this Nash equilibrium, bidder 1's payoff is equal to ______. Please explain!!
I am holding a sealed-bid, second-price auction for a coupon worth one month of free coffee...
I am holding a sealed-bid, second-price auction for a coupon worth one month of free coffee at Uncommon Grounds. You spend $50 on coffee each month, so your private value of this coupon is exactly $50. However, you learn that the other students in COSC 018 are planning to collude in the auction and bid only 10% of their true values in an attempt to lower the cost of coffee on campus. With this information, what should your bidding strategy...
ADVERTISEMENT
Need Online Homework Help?

Get Answers For Free
Most questions answered within 1 hours.

Ask a Question
ADVERTISEMENT