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Consider the following representation of a soccer shootout. The shooter can shoot to their left, or...

Consider the following representation of a soccer shootout. The shooter can shoot to their left, or to their right, and the goalie can anticipate either move. The number in each cell in the table below represents the percentage chance that the shooter scores for each pair of pure strategies.

Anticipate Left Anticipate Right
Shoot Left 50 90
Shoot Right 80 40

In the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of this game, what is the percentage change that the shooter shoots to the right? (ie. An 80% probability should be recorded as 80).

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The answer is 65.

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