Question

Game Theory:

John and Dave are playing a game where they only have two strategies, either to move left or move right. The payoffs from this game are the points that each player will earn given the strategies that each play. The higher the points, the higher the payoffs each player will receive. The normal form representation of the game is presented below.

DAVE

Left Right

Left 1,1 |
0,3 |

Right 3,0 |
2,2 |

John's name label should be on the left side.

a. Does either player in the above game have a dominant strategy? If yes, what is it?

b. Does the game shown above have a dominant strategy equilibrium? If yes, what is it?

c. Does the game shown above have a Nash Equilibrium? If yes, what is it?

d. Is this game an example of the Prisoner's Dilemma? Why or why not?

e. If a game is repeated indefinitely, explain how the Tit for Tat strategy can get players out of the Prisoner's Dilemma.

Answer #1

A) given dave move left, best response for john is right

given dave move right, best response for john is right

So john has dominant strategy of righ

By same reasoing ,dave also ahs a dominant strategy of right.

B) Dominant strategy equilibrium,when both players choose theirs dominant strategy .

So dominant strategy nash equilibrium:(john,dave):(2,2)

C)Yes , dominant strategy equilibrium is the nash equilibrium

D)No, because dominant strategy equilibrium gives is the collusion equilibrium.

E) Because game is not in form of prisnor dilemma ,so there is no need of tit for tat strategy .

Venus and Serena are playing a tennis match. Each of them uses
two strategies: Hit left or hit right. The payoffs from each
strategy combination are given below (The rows correspond to
Venus's strategies, and the columns correspond to Serena's
strategies. The first number in each payoff combination (x,y) is
Venus's payoff, and the second number is Serena's payoff. )
Left
Right
Left
30,70
80,20
Right
90,10
20,80
11. What is Venus's dominant strategy?
12. What is Serena's best response,...

Below is a game between player A and player B. Each player has
two possible strategies: 1 or 2. The payoffs for each combination
of strategies between A and B are in the bracket. For example, if A
plays 1 and B plays 1, the payoff for A is 1 and the payoff for B
is 0. Player B Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Player A Strategy 1 (1,0)
(0,1) Strategy 2 (0,1) (1,0) How many pure strategy Nash equilibria
does...

Consider the following game. Player 1 has 3 actions
(Top, middle,Bottom) and player 2 has three actions (Left, Middle,
Right). Each player chooses their action
simultaneously. The game is played only
once. The first element of the payoff vector is player
1’s payoff. Note that one of the payoffs to player 2 has been
omitted (denoted by x).
Player
2
Left
Middle
Right
Top
(2,-1)
(-2,3)
(3,2)
Middle
(3,0)
(3,3)
(-1,2)
Bottom
(1,2)
(-2,x)
(2,3)
Player
1
a)Determine the range of values for x...

Consider the following prisoner’s dilemma
Player 1
Share
Fight
Share
15,15
5,18
Player
2
Fight
18,5
7,7
a. Identify each players Nash strategies.
b. Does this game have a Nash equilibrium? If yes what is it?
c. Does this game have dominant strategy equilibrium? If yes what
is it?
d What makes it a Prisoner’s dilemma?
e. What is the incentive to cheat?
f....

4. Consider the following non-cooperative, 2-player game. Each
player is a middle manager who wishes to get a promotion. To get
the promotion, each player has two possible strategies: earn it
through hard work (Work) or make the other person look bad through
unscrupulous means (Nasty). The payoff matrix describing this game
is shown below. The payoffs for each player are levels of
utility—larger numbers are preferred to smaller numbers. Player 1’s
payoffs are listed first in each box. Find...

Below is a game between player A and player B. Each player has
two possible strategies: 1 or 2. The payoffs for each combination
of strategies between A and B are in the bracket. For example, if A
plays 1 and B plays 1, the payoff for A is 1 and the payoff for B
is 0.
Player B
Strategy 1
Strategy 2
Player A
Strategy 1
(1,0)
(0,1)
Strategy 2
(0,1)
(1,0)
How many pure strategy Nash equilibria does...

Consider a game where both players have a dominant strategy. In
this type of game ___
a.strategic interactions play no role
b.the optimal decision for both players does not depend on the
behavior of the other player
c.each player is expected to play her dominant strategy
irrespective of the strategy selected by the other player
d.all of the above are correct
e.none of the above are correct

Two firms play the game below. Each must choose strategy 1 or 2.
They choose their strategies simultaneously and without cooperating
with each other. Firm A?'s payoffs
are on the left side of each? cell, and
Firm B?'s payoffs are on the
right.
Firm A
Firm B
Strategy 1
Strategy 2
Strategy 1
10, 16
8, 12
Strategy 2
13, 12
17, 10
Determine the dominant strategy for each firm.
1) For Firm A :
A. Strategy 1 is a...

When playing card games like poker, the strategies available to
players can sometimes be summarized as:
Use Randomness (play unpredictably so that your opponents can't
understand your moves).
Use Math (calculate probabilities based on the cards you can
see, and use this information to make your decisions).
Use Psychology (watch your opponents for signs that they have
especially good or bad hands).
A particular pair of players have different levels of skill in
each of these strategies, so that their...

The matrix below shows payoffs in a stag hunt game. If both
hunters hunt stag, each gets a payoff of 4. If both hunt hare, each
gets 3. If one hunts stag and the other hunts hare, the stag hunter
gets 0 and the hare hunter gets 3.
Hunter B
hunt stag hunt hare
hunt stag 4,4 0,3
Hunter A
hunt hare 3,0 3,3
(a) If you are sure that the other hunter will hunt stag, what
is the best...

ADVERTISEMENT

Get Answers For Free

Most questions answered within 1 hours.

ADVERTISEMENT

asked 21 minutes ago

asked 33 minutes ago

asked 55 minutes ago

asked 55 minutes ago

asked 55 minutes ago

asked 58 minutes ago

asked 1 hour ago

asked 1 hour ago

asked 1 hour ago

asked 1 hour ago

asked 1 hour ago

asked 1 hour ago