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Consider a market with two horizontally differentiated firms, X and Y. Each has a constant marginal...

Consider a market with two horizontally differentiated firms, X and Y. Each has a constant marginal
cost of $20. Demand functions are:
?? = 80 – 2?? + ??
?? = 80 – 2?? + ??

Calculate the Bertrand equilibrium in prices in the market. (You must show steps. Just
writing the answer is NOT acceptable)

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