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Each of two players must choose a number between 1 and 5. If a player’s choice...

Each of two players must choose a number between 1 and 5. If a player’s choice = opposing player’s choice +1, she loses $2; if a player’s choice ≥ opposing player’s choice + 2 , she wins $1. If both players choose the same number the game is a draw.

a. What is the game matrix?

b. Find v+ and v- and determine whether a saddle point exists in pure strategies, and if so, find it.

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