Question

Two firms play the game below. Each must choose strategy 1 or 2. They choose their...

Two firms play the game below. Each must choose strategy 1 or 2. They choose their strategies simultaneously and without cooperating with each other. Firm A?'s payoffs are on the left side of each? cell, and Firm B?'s payoffs are on the right.

Firm A

Firm B

Strategy 1

Strategy 2

Strategy 1 10, 16 8, 12
Strategy 2 13, 12 17, 10


Determine the dominant strategy for each firm.

1) For Firm A :

A. Strategy 1 is a dominant strategy

B. Strategy 2 is a dominant strategy

C. Neither strategy is the dominant strategy

2) For Firm B :

A. Strategy 1 is a dominant strategy

B. Strategy 2 is a dominant strategy

C. Neither strategy is the dominant strategy

3) Because both players have dominant? strategies, this game has an equilibrium in dominant strategies.

A) Both firms choose Strategy 1

B) Both firms choose Strategy 2

C) Firm A chooses Strategy 1 and Firm B chooses Strategy 2

D) Firm A chooses Strategy 2 and Firm B chooses Strategy 1

Homework Answers

Answer #1

Answer.)

1.) For Firm A :- B. Strategy 2 is a dominant strategy

A strategy is a dominant strategy for a player if it yields the best payoff (for that player) no matter what strategies the other players choose. Firm A getting total payoff of 30 from Strategy 2 as compared to 18 from  Strategy 1.

2.)  For Firm B :- A. Strategy 1 is a dominant strategy

A strategy is a dominant strategy for a player if it yields the best payoff (for that player) no matter what strategies the other players choose.  Firm B getting total payoff of 28 from Strategy 1 as compared to 22 from Strategy 2.

3.) D) Firm A chooses Strategy 2 and Firm B chooses Strategy 1.

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