Question

In an election among three choices, nine voters have the following preference orderings, where as usual more-preferred choices are listed higher in the voter's list:

Surya	Chandra	Mangala	Budha	Guru	Shukra	Shani	Rahu	Ketu
Vilya	Narya	Vilya	Narya	Narya	Narya	Nenya	Narya	Nenya
Nenya	Vilya	Nenya	Nenya	Nenya	Nenya	Vilya	Vilya	Vilya
Narya	Nenya	Narya	Vilya	Vilya	Vilya	Narya	Nenya	Narya

In a Borda-count election selecting a single winner, which voter(s) have a possible incentive to vote strategically – that is, to state a preference for a less-preferred choice over a more-preferred choice – when all other voters sincerely express their preferences?

Answer 1

Accessing the data, we construct a data table containing the given information.

Voter(s)	Preferences	Strength
Surya, Mangala	1.Vilya 2. Nenya 3. Narya	2
Budha, Guru, Shukra	1. Narya 2. Nenya 3. Vilya	3
Shani, Ketu	1. Nenya 2. Vilya 3. Narya	2

Rahu, Chandra

1. Narya 2. Vilya 3. Nenya

2

Out of all the combinations, only the highlighted once have repeated values in the same order. So, any one of the voter(s), Budha, Guru and Shukra have more liberty of making less preferred choices than the others.