Consider two Cubans, Jose and Sara. They each enjoy parks but to a different
degree. MWTP JOSE = 9 - 2Q, while MWTP SARA = 6 - Q. The MC of park provision is MC = 3+Q. Find the socially efficient number of parks, and the equilibrium cost per park (of park - provision). Consider that the regulator approaches Jose and Sara and asks each to contribute half that cost (as in marginal cost per park, not total). Jose will want ___ parks and Sara will want ___ parks. Will there be a market failure?
a)3, 3, no
b)3, 3,yes
c)3.5, 2, no
d)2, 3.5, no
e)4, 4, yes
The socially efficient number of parks is determined by the interaction of Marginal social benefit and marginal social cost
MWTP JOSE + MWTP SARA = MC
9 - 2Q + 6 - Q = 3+Q
15 - 3 = 4Q
12 = 4Q
Q = 3 and so the equilibrium cost per park (of park - provision) = MC = 3 + 3 = $6.
If they have to pay half, Jose will want 3 = 9 - 2Q or Q = 6.2 = 3 ___ parks and Sara will want 3 = 6 - Q or Q = 3 ___ parks.
No market failure because each of them wants 3 parks to be provided and this equal to social optimum quantity
Select Option A.
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