Question

Two large firms in the US are the only producers of an identical good that has...

Two large firms in the US are the only producers of an identical good that has no good substitutes. Both firms are identical in size and cost structure. What model of Oligopoly should help us best understand what the equilibrium conditions in the market will look like?

A. Cournot model

B. Stacklberg Modeel

C. Bertrand Model

D. Cartel Model

Two large firms in the US are the only producers of an identical good that has no good substitutes. While both firms are large, one dominates the other in terms of company size and market share. What model of Oligopoly should help us best understand what the equilibrium conditions in the market will look like?

A. Cournot model

B. Stacklberg Modeel

C. Bertrand Model

D. Cartel Model

Homework Answers

Answer #1

Two large firms in the US are the only producers of an identical good that has no good substitutes. Both firms are identical in size and cost structure. What model of Oligopoly should help us best understand what the equilibrium conditions in the market will look like?

C. Bertrand Model

Since the goods are identical, it would be Bertrand model.

Two large firms in the US are the only producers of an identical good that has no good substitutes. While both firms are large, one dominates the other in terms of company size and market share. What model of Oligopoly should help us best understand what the equilibrium conditions in the market will look like?

B. Stacklberg Modeel

Stackleberg model is used to explain the condition when there is a leader in the market.

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