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Suppose you have two players, Player A and Player B. Player A has a .400 On...

Suppose you have two players, Player A and Player B. Player A has a .400 On Base Percentage in 100 Plate Appearances, while Player B has a .350 On Base Percentage in 500 Plate Appearances.

Without any additional information, which player would you expect to have a higher On Base Percentage in a game played tomorrow?

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