Question

Consider the following two-person zero-sum game. Assume the two players have the same two strategy options....

Consider the following two-person zero-sum game. Assume the two players have the same two strategy options. The payoff table shows the gains for Player A.

Player B

Player A strategy b1 strategy b2
strategy a1 3 9
Strategy a2 6 2

Determine the optimal strategy for each player. What is the value of the game?

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