There are three basic propositions in standard Utilitarianism
(Please be sure to read about Mill, his transcript and lecture
located in the FILES section of the shell under Philosopher
Lecturettes and Philosopher audio transcripts ( I do not find the
audio itself ) for background to this threaded discussion):
Actions are judged right and wrong solely on their
consequences; that is, nothing else matters except the consequence,
and right actions are simply those with the best
consequences.
To assess consequences, the only thing that matters is the
amount of happiness and unhappiness caused; that is, there is only
one criterion and everything else is irrelevant.
In calculating happiness and unhappiness caused, nobody’s
happiness counts any more than anybody else’s; that is, everybody’s
welfare is equally important and the majority rules.
In specific cases where justice and utility are in conflict,
it may seem expedient to serve the greater happiness through quick
action that overrules consideration for justice. There is a side to
happiness that can call for rushed decisions and actions that put
decision-makers under the pressure of expediency.
Here is a dilemma for our class:
You are the elected district attorney. You receive a phone
call from a nursing home administrator who was a good friend of
yours in college. She has a waiting list of 3,000 people who will
die if they don't get into her nursing home facility within the
next 3 weeks, and she currently has 400 patients who have asked (or
their families have asked on their behalf) for the famous Dr. Jack
Kevorkian's (fictitious) sister, Dr. Jill Kevorkian, for assistance
in helping them die. The 3,000 people on the waiting list want to
live. She (the nursing home administrator) wants to know if you
would agree to "look the other way" if she let in Dr. Jill to
assist in the suicide of the 400 patients who have requested it,
thus allowing at least 400 of the 3,000 on the waiting list
in.
Do you find that any of the critiques of "Utilitarianism"
apply here? Which? Explain.