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asume the following inverse demand function p(Q) = 100 - 4Q and that the marginal costs...

asume the following inverse demand function

p(Q) = 100 - 4Q and that the marginal costs are MC = 4

A. given a Cournot competiton, calculate the cournot equilibrium values for price, the quantities and the profits.

B. Given a Bertrand competitionm caluculate the equilibrium values for price, the quantities and the profits.

C. Given a Stackelberg competiton, calculate the equilibrium values for price, the quantities and the profits.

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