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4.       Assume that two interior design companies, Alistair and Baine, are competing for customers and if they...

4.       Assume that two interior design companies, Alistair and Baine, are competing for customers and if they both advertise or not advertise, the following pay off table results:

a.       Does each firm have a dominant strategy and if so what is it?

b.       What is the Nash equilibrium?

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