Suppose a drug manufacturer sells a new drug for twitchy feet.
The market demand curve for the drug is P=110-2Q, where P is the
market price and Q is the market quantity. Also suppose the
marginal cost for manufacturing is 10/ unit.
A) Assuming the firm is an unregulated monopolist, what
quantity and price should the firm offer?
Quantity =.
Price = $
B) Now suppose, the manufacturer has identified two separate
classifications of cusC) Suppose the monopoly has broken up into
two separate companies. The demand function is still P=110-2Q as
part A. The firms do not collude and the firms have identical
marginal cost functions (MC1=MC2=10). Also assume they are Cournot
duopolists. Determine the quantity and price of each firm.
Quantity Market 1= .
Price in Market 1 =$.
Quantity in Market 2 =.
Price in Market 2 = $
C) Suppose the monopoly has broken up into two separate
companies. The demand function is still P=110-2Q as part A. The
firms do not collude and the firms have identical marginal cost
functions (MC1=MC2=10). Also assume they are Cournot duopolists.
Determine the quantity and price of each firm.
Quantity for firm 1: .
Quantity for firm 2: .
Price in each market: $
D) Now assume these firms are acting like Bertrand duopolists.
What quantity will each firm produce and what will be the market
price?
Quantity for firm 1 and 2:
Market price: $
E) Assume that firm 1 is acting as a Stackelberg leader and
firm 2 is acting as the Stackelberg follower. The demand function
is still P=110-2Q as part A. The firms do not collude and the firms
have identical marginal cost functions (MC1=MC2=10).
Determine:
(a) the demand function faced by the leader: .
(b) the quantity produced by the leader: .
(c) the quantity produced by the follower: and
(d) market price: