Question

Consider an industry composed by two firms -- Argyle (A) and Blantyre (B) -- that sell...

Consider an industry composed by two firms -- Argyle (A) and Blantyre (B) -- that sell a standardized product. They maximize their profits by choosing how much to produce. The total output of this industry (X) is the sum of the output of the two firms (X = xA+xB ) Both firms have no fixed cost, and a constant marginal cost equal to c1=10. So the cost function is the same for the two firms, and equal to c(x)=10x The demand function of consumers is as follows: X=(210-p)/(2) Where p is the price of the product.

Now imagine that Argyle and Blantyre merge into one single firm. The firm that results from the merger of these two giants is called Cargiltyre. As a result of the merger, there is now only one firm in the industry: Cargiltyre. The demand function of consumer remains the same as before.

(j) How much output will Cargiltyre produce?

(k) What price will Cargiltyre charge for its product?

(l) How much profits will Cargiltyre make?

Homework Answers

Answer #1

Cargiltyre becomes a monoply and so it produces monopoly output. Cost structure is same so both divide the total production equally wuth combined MC = 10. Inverse demand is P = 210 - 2X. This gives the profit function for Cargiltyre as

? = TR - TC

= 210X - 2X^2 - 10X

Maximize profits by placing marginal profit = 0

210 - 4X - 10 = 0

4X = 200

X* = 50

Price = 210 - 2*50 = $110

Profit = 210*50 - 2*(50^2) - 10*50 = 5000.

(j) How much output will Cargiltyre produce?

50 units

(k) What price will Cargiltyre charge for its product?

$110.

(l) How much profits will Cargiltyre make?

$5000.

Know the answer?
Your Answer:

Post as a guest

Your Name:

What's your source?

Earn Coins

Coins can be redeemed for fabulous gifts.

Not the answer you're looking for?
Ask your own homework help question
Similar Questions
Consider an industry composed by two firms -- Argyle (A) and Blantyre (B) -- that sell...
Consider an industry composed by two firms -- Argyle (A) and Blantyre (B) -- that sell a standardized product. They maximize their profits by choosing how much to produce. The total output of this industry (X) is the sum of the output of the two firms (X = xA+xB ) Both firms have no fixed cost, and a constant marginal cost equal to c1=10. So the cost function is the same for the two firms, and equal to c(x)=10x The...
An industry producing a homogeneous commodity is comprised of N(≥ 2) firms. Assume that each firm...
An industry producing a homogeneous commodity is comprised of N(≥ 2) firms. Assume that each firm faces a marginal cost of 1 and no other costs. The industry inverse demand function is P(Q) = 11 − Q, where Q is industry output. (a) Assuming that the firms choose quantities simultaneously, derive the profits of each firm in equilibrium. (b) Two of the firms are considering a merger. A merger simply means that these two firms become one firm, with the...
The can industry is composed of two firms. Suppose that the demand curve for cans is...
The can industry is composed of two firms. Suppose that the demand curve for cans is P=100-Q where P is the price (in cents) of a can and Q is the quantity demanded (in millions per month) of cans. Suppose the total cost function of each firm is TC=2+15Q where TC is total cost (in tens of thousands of dollars) per month and Q is the quantity produced (in millions) per month by the firm. a) what are the price...
Consider a market with only two firms. Demand on this market is given by D(p)= 90...
Consider a market with only two firms. Demand on this market is given by D(p)= 90 - 3p. Initially both firms have the same constant per-unit cost, specifically c1 = c2 = 20 . (a) What is the Nash equilibrium in this market if firms behave as Bertrand competitors? How much does each firm produce, what price do the firms charge, and what are their profits? (b) Now suppose that firm 1 acquires a new production technique that lowers its...
Suppose that two firms compete in the same market producing homogenous products with the following inverse...
Suppose that two firms compete in the same market producing homogenous products with the following inverse demand function: P=1,000-(Q1+Q2) The cost function of each firm is given by: C1=4Q1 C2=4Q2 Suppose that the two firms engage in Bertrand price competition. What price should firm 1 set in equilibrium? What price should firm 2 set? What are the profits for each firm in equilibrium? What is the total market output? Suppose that the two firms collude in quantity, i.e., acting together...
Consider an industry with 10 firms of equal size, such that each firm has 10 percent...
Consider an industry with 10 firms of equal size, such that each firm has 10 percent of total industry sales. What is the HHI index for this industry? Now suppose that three of these firms want to merge. What would be the industry HHI index if this merger were to occur? Would this proposed merger likely trigger regulatory action by the U.S. Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission? Explain.
There are two potential firms in an industry with demand P=130-Q. Both firms have a constant...
There are two potential firms in an industry with demand P=130-Q. Both firms have a constant marginal cost of production equal to $40. The fixed cost to both firms is $1300. a) How many firms will be in the market, and what is the industry level of output , and what is the profit for each firm? b) Would an incumbent firm that faces the possibility of entry from one firm prefer the above situation or would it prefer that...
Consider two firms, Firm A and Firm B, who compete as duopolists. Each firm produces an...
Consider two firms, Firm A and Firm B, who compete as duopolists. Each firm produces an identical product. The total inverse demand curve for the industry is ? = 250 − (?? + ?? ). Firm A has a total cost curve ?? (?? ) = 100 + ?? 2 . Firm B has a total cost curve ?? (?? ) = 100 + 2??. a. Suppose for now, only Firm A exists (?? = 0). What is the Monopoly...
1. Consider a market with inverse demand P (Q) = 100 - Q and 5 firms...
1. Consider a market with inverse demand P (Q) = 100 - Q and 5 firms with cost function C(q) = 40q. (a) Find the Cournot equilibrium outputs, price and profit. (b) If 4 firms merge with no efficiency gain, do they increase or decrease their profits? By how much? (c) Is the result in (b) expected? (d) What are the effects of this merger on price and social welfare?
Suppose there are two firms operating in a market. The firms produce identical products, and the...
Suppose there are two firms operating in a market. The firms produce identical products, and the total cost for each firm is given by C = 10qi, i = 1,2, where qi is the quantity of output produced by firm i. Therefore the marginal cost for each firm is constant at MC = 10. Also, the market demand is given by P = 106 –2Q, where Q= q1 + q2 is the total industry output. The following formulas will be...