Question

A game has two players. Each player
has two possible strategies. One strategy is Cooperate, the other
is Defect. Each player writes on a piece of paper either a *C*
for cooperate or a *D* for defect. If both players write
*C*, they each get a payoff of *$100*. If both players
write *D*, they each get a payoff of *0*. If one player
writes *C* and the other player writes *D*, the
cooperating player gets a payoff of S and the defecting player gets
a payoff of *T*. To defect will be a dominant strategy for
both players if

Select one:

a. *S* < *T* and *T* >
100

b. *S* and *T* are any positive
numbers

c. *T* > 2S

d. *S* < 0 and *T* >
100

e. *S* + *T* > 100

Answer #1

24. Two players are engaged in a game of Chicken. There are
two possible strategies: swerve and drive straight. A player who
swerves is called Chicken and gets a payoff of zero, regardless of
what the other player does. A player who drives straight gets a
payoff of 432 if the other player swerves and a payoff of −48 if
the other player also drives straight. This game has two pure
strategy equilibria and
a. a mixed strategy equilibrium in...

Below is a game between player A and player B. Each player has
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is 0.
Player B
Strategy 1
Strategy 2
Player A
Strategy 1
(1,0)
(0,1)
Strategy 2
(0,1)
(1,0)
How many pure strategy Nash equilibria does...

Below is a game between player A and player B. Each player has
two possible strategies: 1 or 2. The payoffs for each combination
of strategies between A and B are in the bracket. For example, if A
plays 1 and B plays 1, the payoff for A is 1 and the payoff for B
is 0. Player B Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Player A Strategy 1 (1,0)
(0,1) Strategy 2 (0,1) (1,0) How many pure strategy Nash equilibria
does...

In a dominant strategy equilibrium a player uses a strategy
that maximizes his utility no matter what strategies other players
use. True or false?
In a nash equilibrium a player uses the strategy that maximizes
his utility no matter what strategies other players uses. True or
false?
Consider a game where there is a dominant strategy equilibrium.
You would then argue that, in equilibrium
a-Each player gets the highest utility he can possibly get
b-Total surplus is not necessarily maximized
c-Total...

If only one player has a dominant strategy in a game with two
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16. Two gas stations, A and B, are locked in a price war. Each
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charge the low price (C). They will choose strategies
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$100. If one chooses R and the other chooses C, (i) the one that
chooses R loses many of its customers and earns $0, and (ii) the
one that chooses C wins many...

Two firms play the game below. Each must choose strategy 1 or 2.
They choose their strategies simultaneously and without cooperating
with each other. Firm A?'s payoffs
are on the left side of each? cell, and
Firm B?'s payoffs are on the
right.
Firm A
Firm B
Strategy 1
Strategy 2
Strategy 1
10, 16
8, 12
Strategy 2
13, 12
17, 10
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1) For Firm A :
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Two firms are competing in prices. Each has two strategies:
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Firm 2
Undercut Cooperate
100, 100
1000, 0
0, 1000
500, 500
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2
(b) (2...

A hundred players are participating in this game (N = 100). Each
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(b) Find all strategies that survive the Iterative Elimination
of Dominated Strategies (IEDS) (if any).
IEDS:...

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