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. Present your formal analysis carefully and compute the Nash equilibria of the following location game...

. Present your formal analysis carefully and compute the Nash equilibria of the following location game in pure strategies. There are two people who simultaneously select numbers between zero and one. Suppose player 1 chooses s1 and player 2 chooses s2. If si < sj , then player i gets a payoff of (si+sj ) 2 and player j obtains 1 − (si+sj ) 2 , for i = 1, 2. If s1 = s2, then both players get a payoff of 1/2.

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