Question

Explain why tit-for-tat is not an SPNE to the twice-repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma.

Explain why tit-for-tat is not an SPNE to the twice-repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma.

Homework Answers

Answer #1

The Strategy of tit for tat is that in which ones action is repeated by they another one.

For Example, suppose there are say player 1 and player 2, in which whatever action done by player 1 in laid way and time will be done by player 2, if player 1 does some error then same will be repeated by player 2.

Thus, to implement this strategy of defecting will not hold significantly as it is not dominant strategy to after every time period.

So that tit for tat strategy is not an SPNE to the twice in relation with the prisoners dilemma, because in case of SPNE there is the sequence of defects after every laid history

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