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Firms can 3rd degree price discriminate. Each group's demand is given by pA=150-xA and pB=100-2xB and...

Firms can 3rd degree price discriminate. Each group's demand is given by pA=150-xA and pB=100-2xB and a firm cost function C(x)=x^{2}. What is the price in market A? Enter a number only.

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