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Consider the market for used cars and let X = value of the car. Sellers know...

Consider the market for used cars and let X = value of the car. Sellers know the value of the car they sell and their utility is U(X) = X. Buyers only know that car value is uniformly distributed on (50,150) and their utility is 1.5×X. Suppose the posted price for used cars is 90. Will consumers buy a car at this price? Explain.

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