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Consider the following simultaneous move game If both players choose strategy A, player 1 earns $526...

Consider the following simultaneous move game If both players choose strategy A, player 1 earns $526 and player 2 earns $526. If both players choose strategy B, then player 1 earns $746 and player 2 earns $406. If player 1 chooses strategy B and player 2 chooses strategy A, then player 1 earns $307 and player 2 earns $336. If player 1 chooses strategy A and player 2 chooses strategy B, then player 1 earns $966 and player 2 earns $325. What is the maximum amount Player 1 should be willing to pay for the opportunity to move first instead of moving at the same time as Player 2?

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