Question

Question Two                                        &nb

Question Two                                                                                    
TEXplor has purchased a 2-year lease on land adjacent to the land leased by Clampett. The land leased by TEXplor lies above the same crude oil deposit. Assume
each company sinks wells of the same size at the same time. If both companies sink wide wells, each will extract 2 million barrels in 6 months, but each company will receive profit of only GHC 1 million. On the other if each company sinks a narrow well, it will take a year for Clampett and TEXplor to extract their respective shares, but their profits will be GHC14 million apiece. Finally, if one company drills a wide well while the other company drills a narrow well, the first company will extract 3 million barrels and the second company will extract only 1 million barrels. In this case, the first company will earn profits of GHC 16 million and the second company will actually lose GHC 1million.
1. Illustrate this using a normal form game.                                        

2. Does either firm have a strictly dominant strategy? If yes, what is (are) these strategies? Explain your answer.                                                     

3. What strategy will each firm adopt? Explain your answer.               

4. Does this game have a Nash equilibrium? Explain your answer                                                                                                                                                 

5. Is collusion possible in this game? Explain your answer.              

Homework Answers

Answer #1

1. This can be illustrated in a game-theoretic environment in a normal form game with the following pay-off matrix. There are 2 players in this game, {Company 1, Company 2} and the strategy set is {Sink wide well, Sink narrow well}. The pay-offs are represented in each of the cells of the matrix for each firm with their as well as their counterpart's strategy.

Company 2
Sink wide wells Sink narrow wells
Company 1 Sink wide wells (1,1) (16,-1)
Sink narrow wells (-1,16) (14,14)

2. Yes, both of the firms have a strictly dominant strategy. The strictly dominant strategy for both of the players is to Sink wide well. The reason is that irrespective of their opponent's strategy, it is optimal (max pay-off) for the player to Sink wide well.

3. Each firm will adopt to sink wide well as it gives them the optimal pay-off/ profit irrespective of the opponent's strategy.

4. Yes, there exists a Nash equilibrium which is for both to Sink wide well and earn a pay-off of 1 million each (1,1). There is no tendency here for each one to deflect to any other strategy.

Know the answer?
Your Answer:

Post as a guest

Your Name:

What's your source?

Earn Coins

Coins can be redeemed for fabulous gifts.

Not the answer you're looking for?
Ask your own homework help question
Similar Questions
TEXplor has purchased a 2-year lease on land adjacent to the land leased by Clampett. The...
TEXplor has purchased a 2-year lease on land adjacent to the land leased by Clampett. The land leased by TEXplor lies above the same crude oil deposit. Assume each company sinks wells of the same size at the same time. If both companies sink wide wells, each will extract 2 million barrels in 6 months, but each company will receive profit of only GHC 1 million. On the other if each company sinks a narrow well, it will take a...
TEXplor has purchased a 2-year lease on land adjacent to the land leased by Clampett. The...
TEXplor has purchased a 2-year lease on land adjacent to the land leased by Clampett. The land leased by TEXplor lies above the same crude oil deposit. Assume each company sinks wells of the same size at the same time. If both companies sink wide wells, each will extract 2 million barrels in 6 months, but each company will receive profit of only GHC 1 million. On the other if each company sinks a narrow well, it will take a...
QUESTION 3 Below is a game between player A and player B. Each player has two...
QUESTION 3 Below is a game between player A and player B. Each player has two possible strategies: 1 or 2. The payoffs for each combination of strategies between A and B are in the bracket. For example, if A plays 1 and B plays 1, the payoff for A is -3 and the payoff for B is -2. Player B Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Player A Strategy 1 (-3,-2) (10,0) Strategy 2 (0,8) (0,0) How many pure strategy Nash...
MTN and Airtel are two telecommunication giants engaged in a battle to win customers from a...
MTN and Airtel are two telecommunication giants engaged in a battle to win customers from a saturated market of mobile users. Historically, they both know that intensive advertising can help them win customers from other operators even though advertising is expensive. So each firm has to decide whether to choose a high level of advertising (H) or a low level of advertising (L). If both firms choose high level of advertising, the advertisement campaigns will simply offset each other and...
Two duopolists have the following market demand and cost structures. P = 2000 – 2Q; MR=...
Two duopolists have the following market demand and cost structures. P = 2000 – 2Q; MR= 2000-4Q MC is constant at 400, and FC=0 If the firms cooperate to set quantity, what will cartel quantities, prices, and profits be? Make sure to identify each firm’s q, P and profits as well [6] One firm cheats to lower its price by $100. What happens to the quantity and profits of this firm? If the other firm does not reduce its price...
Two firms operating in the same market must choose between a high price and a low...
Two firms operating in the same market must choose between a high price and a low price. In the payoff matrix below, Firm A's profit is listed before the comma, B's profit is listed after the comma. The firms are playing a one-period (“one shot”) simultaneous game. Firm B High Price Low Price Firm A High Price 40,40 18,50 Low Price 50,18 25,25 a. State whether each firm does or does not have a dominant strategy. No explanation is necessary...
Two firms operating in the same market must choose between a high price and a low...
Two firms operating in the same market must choose between a high price and a low price. In the payoff matrix below, Firm A's profit is listed before the comma, B's profit is listed after the comma. The firms are playing a one-period (“one shot”) simultaneous game. Firm B High Price Low Price Firm A High Price 40,40 18,50 Low Price 50,18 25,25 State whether each firm does or does not have a dominant strategy. No explanation is necessary –...
Consider a Cournot duopoly of two identical cigarette producing firms, Warlboro and Cramel. They produce tobacco...
Consider a Cournot duopoly of two identical cigarette producing firms, Warlboro and Cramel. They produce tobacco of same quality and, ceteris paribus, each firm sells to 1 million smokers, making $100 profits per smoker. These 2 million smokers are addicts (as most smokers are). They may change which tobacco they smoke but they do not quit. On the other hand, those who are not smokers will not start even if they are encouraged (because they understand the harm). In other...
Last month you assumed the position of manager for a large car dealership. The distinguishing feature...
Last month you assumed the position of manager for a large car dealership. The distinguishing feature of this dealership is its "no hassle' pricing strategy; prices (usually well below the sticker price) are posted on the windows, and your sales staff has a reputation for not negotiating with customers. Last year, your company spent $2 million on advertisements to inform customers about its “no hassle policy” and had overall sales revenue of $40 million. A recent study from an agency...
(This question is a variation on the pricing dilemma game from class.) Two firms, A and...
(This question is a variation on the pricing dilemma game from class.) Two firms, A and B, sell widgets to a market of 100 buyers. The firms' widgets are undifferentiated, and the firms know each others' costs and capacities. Furthermore the firms are playing a one-time pricing game; widgets are obsolete after this one selling opportunity. Each buyer is interested in purchasing a single widget, and has an RP of $10. Firm A has lower costs than Firm B, but...