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What is the homogeneous-good duopoly Cournot equilibrium if the market demand function is Q = 1,000...

What is the homogeneous-good duopoly Cournot equilibrium if the market demand function is Q = 1,000 - 1,000p, and each firm's marginal cost is $0.28 per unit? The Cournot-Nash equilibrium occurs where q 1 = ? and q 2 = ?. (Enter numeric responses using real numbers rounded to two decimal places.)

Solve for q1 and q2 and determine the equilibrium price.

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