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Consider the following version of the simultaneous-move stag-hunt game. S H S 9,9 0,8 H 8,0...

Consider the following version of the simultaneous-move stag-hunt game.

S H
S 9,9 0,8
H 8,0 7,7

(C)Suppose now that players move in sequence: player 1 moves first, and player 2 chooses his action after observing player 1’s action. Draw the extensive form of this game. Find its subgame perfect equilibrium.

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