Question

Firm A Firm B Low Price High Price Low Price (10,9) (15,8) High Price (-10,7) (11,11)...

Firm A Firm B
Low Price High Price
Low Price (10,9) (15,8)
High Price (-10,7) (11,11)

(a) Does Firm A have a dominant strategy? What is it? Please explain.

(b) Does Firm B have a dominant strategy? What is it? Please explain.

(c) Is (High Price, High Price) a Nash equilibrium? Please explain.

Homework Answers

Answer #1

a) When B choose Low price, A will choose Low price as 10>-10

When B choose High price, A will choose Low price as 15>11

So, A has a dominant strategy of choosing Low price

b) When A choose Low price,B will choose Low price as 9>8

When A choose High price, B will choose High price as 11>7

So, B does not have a dominant strategy

c) High price,High price is not a Nash equilibrium because at this payoff, A can deviate from the outcome and choose Low price as 15>11

The Nash Equilibrium in this payoff table is Low Price,Low Price at which neither party has an incentive to deviate from the outcome

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