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Suppose two firms are competing in prices (Bertrand) in an industry where demand is P=360-12Q. Assume...

Suppose two firms are competing in prices (Bertrand) in an industry where demand is P=360-12Q. Assume neither firm faces any fixed costs. (a) If both firms have MC=150, what is the equilibrium price? Profits? (b) Suppose Firm 1 has MC1 = 240 and Firm 2 has MC2 = 0. Approximately how much profit does each firm make? (c) Suppose Firm 1 has MC1 = 204 and Firm 2 has MC2 = 96. Approximately how much profit does each firm make?

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