Question

Using the same payoff matrix:

Peter / MJ	Confess About Knowing	Lie About Knowing	Lie About Liking Peter	Confess to Liking Peter
Admit Being Spidey	2,2	3,1	8,12	3,14
Lie About Spidey	1,1	4,2	9,8	1,7
Lie About Liking MJ	4,5	8,6	14,18	4,14
Confess to Liking MJ	5,2	7,1	12,14	5,16

Which of the following are Nash Equilibrium payoffs (select all that apply):

Group of answer choices

(4,14)

(8,6)

(8,12)

(5,2)

(9,8)

(3,1)

(1,1)

(7,1)

(4,5)

(1,7)

(12,14)

(5,16)

(2,2)

(14,18)

(4,2)

(3,14)

Answer 1

In nash equilibrium strategy no player has any incentive to switch to other strategy from its nash equilibrium.

If peter chooses (confess to liking MJ =5) , it is optimal for MJ to Choose (confess to liking Peter =16) , At this strategy no player has any incentive to move to other strategy so it (5,16) is a nash equilibrium.

If peter chooses (lie about liking MJ =14) , it is optimal for MJ to Choose (lie about liking Peter =18) , At this strategy no player has any incentive to move to other strategy so it (14,18) is a nash equilibrium