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A and B are the only two companies that make a particular kind of software. The...

A and B are the only two companies that make a particular kind of software. The market demand for this code is given by P = 700 – 4Q. The marginal cost of production for each firm is a constant 60.

  1. If these two firms compete as an oligopoly what are each one’s price, output, and profit?
  2. If they collude what are each one’s price, output and profit?
  3. If the best model of this situation is a Von Stackelberg approach with A firm setting its Q first what are each firm’s price, output and profit?

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