Question

Two firms have the following cost functions (and the marginal cost functions in parentheses) Firm 1:...

Two firms have the following cost functions (and the marginal cost functions in parentheses)
Firm 1: C1 = 0.75q13 – 6q12 + 180q1 (MC1 = 2.25q12 – 12q1 + 180)
Firm 2: C2 = 0.5q23 – 20q22 + 100q2 (MC2 = 1.5q22 – 40q2 + 100

At what output level is average cost minimized at each firm?
Firm 1:  
Firm 2:

If the 2 firms merged, they would have the following joint cost function:
C = 0.75q13 – 6q12 + 180q1 + 0.5q23 – 20q22 + 100q2 + 3q1q2

Assuming positive production of both goods, would the merger create economies of scope?  

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