Question

Consider two market segments with the following demand functions:

Market segment 1: Q1 P= 10-2P

Market segment 2: Q2 P= 10-4P

Suppose that MC of production is 6.

What is the optimal pricing policy for this firm?

Answer #1

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A monopoly serves two markets with demand functions of
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c_1(q_1)=q_1c1(q1)=q1, c_2(q_2)=2q_2c2(q2)=2q2.
Draw the game tree and solve for the pure SPE.
Write down each firm's strategy in the pure SPE here: Firm 1:,
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Consider a duopoly with two firms with the cost functions:
Firm 1: C1(q1)=5q1
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The firms compete in a market with inverse demand
p = 300 - 8Q
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What is the Nash-Cournot equilibrium output of firm 1? Round to
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Consider two identical firms competing in a market described
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• (Inverse) Demand: P = 50 − Q , where Q = q1 + q2
• Cost Firm 1: C1 = 20q1 +q1^2
• Cost Firm 2: C2 = 20q2 + q2^2
a. (1 point) What is firm 1’s marginal cost? Firm 2’s marginal
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Consider a market with two identical firms. The market demand is
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Solve for the quantity, price, and profit for each firm.
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