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Consider two market segments with the following demand functions: Market segment 1: Q1 P= 10-2P Market...

Consider two market segments with the following demand functions:

Market segment 1: Q1 P= 10-2P

Market segment 2: Q2 P= 10-4P

Suppose that MC of production is 6.

What is the optimal pricing policy for this firm?

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