Question

would you consider nivea for men as market leader or a market follower in this category

would you consider nivea for men as market leader or a market follower in this category

Homework Answers

Answer #1

Answer - Nivea is a market leader and not a market follower. It is among the biggest cosmetic brands and has has lead the market from the front. It is not a brand which is trying to follow the other cosmetic brands and trying to catch the consumer demands. It has just diversified the product line and has added the mens cosmetic products too. It is consistently gaining the additional market share rather than following other brands. Hence it is a market leader.

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