Q1. Consider the following game. A spy (row player) is trying to get away from the villain (column player) by skiing down one of three routes. The villain can choose to explode a bomb (which is costly) and cause an avalanche or not explode a bomb. Payo↵s are given by the following matrix:
Don't explode Explode
1 (12,0) (0.6)
2 (7,1) (1,5)
3 (9,3) (6,0)
a. Are there any routes that the spy should never to choose?
b. Let q be the probability with which the villain chooses ‘Don’t Explode’. What should
the spy do if q > 2/3? What about if q < 2/3?
c. Derive the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of this game. Prove that it is an equilib- rium.
(Remember to show all working)
In above game we can see that Spy has 3 routes to choose
Among these 3 routes route 3 is strcitly dominating route 2 hence Spy will never play route 2 when route 3 is available to him.
Answer for B)
If Mixed strategy profile for villain we can calculate as below
if Villain plays DE with probability q and E with probability 1-q
Spy to be indifferent between DE and E
Expected payoff (Route 1)=12q+0*(1-q)=12q
Expected payoff (Route 3)=9q+6(1-q)=3q+6
Expected payoff (Route 1)=Expected payoff (Route 3)
12q=3q+6
9q=6
q=2/3
Hence when q<2/3
Expected Payoff(Route 1)=12(2/3)=8 and Expected Payoff(Route 3)=3(2/3)+6=8 Hence Equillibruim
hence if q=1/3<2/3
Expected Payoff(Route 1)=4 and Expected Payoff(Route 2)=7
hence Spy will play Route 2 when q<2/3 and will play Route 1 when q>2/3
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