Question

Two players can name a positive integer number from 1 to 6. If the sum of...

Two players can name a positive integer number from 1 to 6. If the sum of the two numbers does not exceed 6 each player obtains payoff equal to the number that the player named. If the sum exceeds 6, the player who named the lower number obtains the payoff equal to that number and the other player obtains a payoff equal to the difference between 6 and the lower number. If the sum exceeds 6 and both numbers are equal each player obtains a payoff of 3. Find all pure strategy Nash equilibria of this game.

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