Question

what was the issue in the court case of the united states of america v. Dennis Moran?

Answer 1

INTRODUCTION AND SOME FACTS

Dennis Moran (Moran), the defendant, is a full-time Omaha, Nebraska, police officer and the owner of a "mom-and-pop" movie rental business which rents video cassettes of copyrighted mo- tion pictures to the public. On April 14, 1989, agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) executed a court-ordered search warrant on the premises of Moran's business. The FBI seized vari- ous video cassettes appearing to be unauthorized copies of copyrighted motion pictures, including "Bat 21," "Big," "Crocodile Dundee II," "The Fourth Protocol," "Hell-Bound: Hellraiser II," and "Mystic Pizza." The parties have stipulated that these six motion pictures are validly copyrighted motion pictures. The parties have further stipulated that each of the six motion pictures was distrib-uted to Moran, with the permission of the copyright holder, between February 1, 1989, and April 14, 1989. The parties have further stipulated that at least one of the movies identified was repro- duced by Moran onto a video cassette, without the authorization of the copyright holder, placed into inventory for rental, and subsequently rented.

At the time the FBI executed the search warrant, Moran was fully cooperative. He told the FBI agents he put the "duped" copies out for rental and held the "originals" back because he feared the "original" motion pictures would be stolen or damaged. Moran told the FBI agents at the time they executed the warrant that he believed this practice was legal as long as he had purchased and was in possession of the "original" motion picture. Moran further advised the FBI agents that he would af- fix to the "duped" copies title labels for the copyrighted motion pictures and a copy of the FBI copy- right warning label commonly found on video cassette tapes. Moran [*1048] advised the FBI agents that he put the title labels and FBI warning on the tapes to stop customers from stealing or duplicat- ing the tapes. Moran testified at trial. He indicated that he had been employed as an Omaha, Nebraska, police officer for approximately twenty-two-and-a-half years, including service as a narcotics investigator and as a bodyguard to the mayor of the city of Omaha. Moran has a reputation for honesty among his associates. Moran testified that he began to "insure" copyrighted video cassettes, meaning that he dupli- cated copyrighted video cassettes which he had validly purchased from distributors, when he real- ized copyrighted tapes were being vandalized. Moran testified he was under the impression that "in- suring" tapes was legal whereas "pirating" tapes was not.

For practical purposes, Moran defined "in- suring" versus "pirating" as meaning that he could duplicate a copyrighted tape provided he had purchased the copyrighted tape and did not endeavor to rent both the copyrighted tape and the du- plicate he had made. Moran testified that he formulated his belief about "insuring" versus "pirating"when talking with various colleagues in the business and from reading trade publications. However, Moran was not able to specifically identify the source of his information.
There was no persuasive evidence that Moran made multiple copies of each authorized version of the copyrighted material. The evidence indicates that Moran purchased more than one copy- righted tape of the same movie, but the persuasive evidence also reveals that Moran made only one copy of each copyrighted tape he purchased. There was no persuasive evidence that Moran endeav- ored to rent both the copyrighted tape and the duplicate. When Moran made the unauthorized copy, he put the unauthorized copy in a package made to resemble as closely as possible the package con- taining the original copyrighted motion picture Moran had purchased from an authorized distributor.

THE LAW

Moran makes two arguments. First, Moran argues that the government must prove that he had the specific intent to violate the law, that is, he knew that what he was doing was illegal and he committed the act nevertheless. Secondly, Moran argues that he did not have the specific intent to Violate the law and, as a consequence, should be found not guilty. In pertinent part 17 U.S.C. §506(a) punishes as a criminal any "person who infringes a copyright willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain." Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §106(3), the owner of a copyright has the exclusive right to "distribute copies of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending." The "exclusive right" of the owner of a copyright is subject to a variety of exceptions.

                     THE FIRST SITUATION
It must first be determined whether the word "willfully," as used in 17 U.S.C. §506(a), requires a showing of "bad purpose" or "evil motive" in the sense that there was an "intentional violation of a known legal duty." Adopting the research of the Motion Picture Association of America, the government argues that the term "willful" means only "an intent to copy and not to infringe." Letter Brief of Government at 4 (citing United States v. Backer, United States v. Taxe, 380 F. Supp. 1010 . On the other hand, Moran argues that the use of the word "willful" implies the kind of specific intent re- quired to be proven in federal tax cases, which is to say, a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty. Defendant's Memorandum Brief at 1 (citing United States v. Cross, 816 F.2d 297, 300-01 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Heilman, (7th Cir.), cert. denied, . The general rule is, of course, that ignorance of the law or mistake of the law is no defense to a criminal prosecution. However, when the term "willfully" is used in complex statutory schemes, such as federal criminal tax statutes, the term "willful" means a "voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty." Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991) (holding in a criminal tax prosecu- tion that a good faith misunderstanding of the law or a good faith belief that one is not violating the law negates willfulness, whether or not the claimed belief or misunderstanding is objectively reasonable).1 As the Court recognized in Cheek, in United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 396 (1933), the Supreme Court said that:
This was evidently so because "the proliferation of statutes and regulations has
sometimes made it difficult for the average citizen to know and comprehend the ex-
tent of the duties and obligations imposed by the tax law." the statutory damage context, a civil plaintiff is generally entitled to recover no less than $250.00 nor more than $ 10,000.00 per act of infringement. 17 U.S.C. §504(c)(1). But where the in- fringement is committed "willfully," the court in its discretion may increase the award of statutory damages up to a maximum of $ 50,000.00 per act of infringement. 17 U.S.C. §504(c)(2). On the other hand, in the case of "innocent infringement," if the defendant sustains the burden of proving he/she was not aware, and had no reason to believe, that his/her acts constituted an infringement
of the copyright, and the court so finds, the court may in its discretion reduce the applicable minimum to $ 100.00 per act of infringement. 17 U.S.C. §504(c)(2

THE SECOND SITUATION

Having determined that the standard enunciated by the Supreme Court in Cheek, 498 U.S. 192, applies, it is important to recognize that the rule does not require that a defendant's belief that his conduct is lawful be judged by an objective standard. Rather, the test is whether Moran truly believed that the copyright laws did not prohibit him from making one copy of a video cassette he had purchased in order to "insure" against vandalism. In other words, the test is not whether Moran's view was objectively reasonable, but rather, whether Moran truly believed that the law did not pro- scribe his conduct. Of course, the more unreasonable the asserted belief or misunderstanding, the more likely it is that the finder of fact will consider the asserted belief or misunderstanding to be nothing more than simple disagreement with known legal duties imposed by the law, and will find that the government has carried its burden of proving knowledge.

Most of the government's argument that it proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Moran violated the criminal copyright statute, even if the word "willfully" is defined as Moran suggests, is based upon the assumption that Moran's beliefs must be "objectively" reasonable. As indicated Labove, Moran's beliefs need not have been objectively reasonable; rather, if Moran truly believed that he was not subject to the copyright laws, then his subjective belief would defeat a finding that he "willfully" violated the statute.

SUMMARY

In summary, when Moran's actions were viewed from the totality of the circumstances, the government failed to convince me beyond a reasonable doubt that Moran acted willfully. Moran is a long-time street cop who was fully cooperative with law enforcement authorities. He is obviously not sophisticated and, at least from the record, his business operation of renting movies to the public was not large or sophisticated. Rather, Moran's business appears to have been of the "mom-and- pop" variety. Moran's practice of "insuring," while obviously shifting the risk of loss from Moran to the copyright holder, was conducted in such a way as not to maximize profits, which one assumes would have been his purpose if he had acted willfully. For example, Moran purchased multiple authorized copies of the same movie, but he made only one unauthorized copy for each authorized version purchased. This suggests that Moran truly believed that what he was doing was in fact legal. I therefore find Moran not guilty.