Player 1 chooses T, M, or B. Player 2 chooses L, C, or R.
L | C | R | |
T | 0, 1 | -1, 1 | 1, 0 |
M | 1, 3 | 0, 1 | 2, 2 |
B | 0, 1 | 0, 1 | 3, 1 |
(2 points each)
(a) Find all strictly dominated strategies for Player 1. You should state what strategy strictly dominates them.
(b) Find all weakly dominated strategies for Player 2. You should state what strategy weakly dominates them.
(c) Is there any weakly dominant strategy for player 1? If yes, find it.
(d) Is there any weakly dominant strategy for player 2? If yes, find it.
(e) Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
(f) Determine if each equilibrium is Pareto efficient.
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