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Two players simultaneously name fractions of the pie that they would like to take for themselves...

Two players simultaneously name fractions of the pie that they would like to take for themselves (between 0 and 1). If the two fractions add up to 1 or less, both players get the fractions that they called out. (If they both call out 1⁄2, they each get 1⁄2). If the two fractions add up to more than 1, they both get nothing (If they both call out 2/3, they both get nothing). What are the Nash equilibria of the game?

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Answer #1

LETS TAKE EXAMPLE OF SOME VALUES-

WE TOOK 3 VALUES 1/3 1/2 AND 2/3

AND USING THEM FORMED A NORMAL FORM OF GAME AND SOLVED IT.

FROM THIS EXAMPLE WE CAN GENRALISE THAT WHEN THE SUM OF PAYOFFS= 1 THEN THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM OCCURS SO ALL THE PAYOFFS WHICH GIVES SUM OF 1 ARE NASH EQUILIBRIA.

HOPE IT WAS HELPFUL FOR YOU. PLEASE GIVE IT A LIKE. THANKYOU!

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