Question

Player 1                               Player 2 Left Right Up $1,200, $700 $1,800, $600

Player 1

                              Player 2

Left

Right

Up

$1,200, $700

$1,800, $600

Down

$1,000, $3,000

$1,750, $4,000

1. Which of the following is true?

A. Player 1 has a dominant strategy, and Player 2 does not.  

B. Player 2 has a dominant strategy, and Player 1 does not.

C. The Nash Equilibrium equals Player 1 Down, Player 2 Right

D. The Nash Equilibrium equals Player 1 Down, Player 2 Left

2. Which of the following is true?

A. Player 2 has a dominant strategy and Player 1 does not

B. There is two Nash Equilibria in a one-shot version

C. There is a unique Nash Equilibrium in a one-shot version

E. None of the above

Homework Answers

Answer #1

Because you can see only player one has a dominant strategy

(A)is the answer

And because dominant strategy exist only for player one and not player 2

(B,C,D) are wrong

2)

First option is false because only player one has a dominant strategy. there are no two Nash equilibria as you can see from the above figure the only Nash equilibrium is (1200,700) or (Up,left)

Therefore (A,B,D) are wrong and

(C) is the answer to this question

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