Let the market demand for carbonated water be given by QD = 100 − 5P. Let there be two firms producing carbonated water, each with a constant marginal cost of 2.
a) What is the market equilibrium price and quantity when each firm
behaves as a Cournot duopolist choosing quantities? What profit
does each firm earn?
b) Sketch the Cournot response functions for firm 1 and firm 2.
c) What is the market equilibrium price and quantity when each firm behaves as a Bertrand duopolist choosing price? What firm profit does each firm earn now?
d) Sketch the Bertrand response functions for firm 1 and firm 2.
Cournot duopoly equilibrium can be obtained when the firms are competing over quantity and Bertrand duopoly equilibrium can be obtained when both the firms are competing over price.
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