Question

Zero Sum Game 2             C1    C2     U1    3        6     U2    5 &nbs

Zero Sum Game 2

            C1    C2

    U1    3        6

    U2    5        4

What is the company's strategy?

Business   Economics   
0 0
Add a commentTranscribed image text
Next >

Homework Answers

Answer #1

The company's strategy is U2, C1.

If row player choose U1 then column player will choose C1 to loose 3 as 3 < 6
If row player choose U2 then column player will choose C2 to loose 4 as 4 < 5
Now, row player will choose U2 as 4 > 3 because he maximizes his minimum payoff- maximin payoff.

If column player choose C1 then row player will choose U2 to gain 5 as 5 > 3
If column player choose C2 then row player will choose U1 to gain 6 as 6 > 4
Now, column player will choose C1 as 5 < 6 to minimise her maximum loss - minimax payoff.

Thus, company's strategy is U2, C1.

0 0
Know the answer?
Your Answer:

Post as a guest

Your Name:

What's your source?

Earn Coins

Coins can be redeemed for fabulous gifts.

Log In

Sign Up

Not the answer you're looking for?
Ask your own homework help question
Similar Questions
A): compute projw j if u1=[-7,1,4] u2=[-1,1,-2],w=span{u1,u2}. (u1 and u2 are orthogonal) B): let u1=[1,1,1], u2=1/3...
A): compute projw j if u1=[-7,1,4] u2=[-1,1,-2],w=span{u1,u2}. (u1 and u2 are orthogonal) B): let u1=[1,1,1], u2=1/3 *[1,1,-2] and w=span{u1,u2}. Construct an orthonormal basis for w.
Linear Algebra Write x as the sum of two vectors, one is Span {u1, u2, u3}...
Linear Algebra Write x as the sum of two vectors, one is Span {u1, u2, u3} and one in Span {u4}. Assume that {u1,...,u4} is an orthogonal basis for R4 u1 = [0, 1, -6, -1] , u2 = [5, 7, 1, 1], u3 = [1, 0, 1, -6], u4 = [7, -5, -1, 1], x = [14, -9, 4, 0] x = (Type an integer or simplified fraction for each matrix element.)      
4 A) Considering the following two-person zero-sum game, what percentage of the time should the row...
4 A) Considering the following two-person zero-sum game, what percentage of the time should the row player play strategy X2?                                                                                                             Y1             Y2                                                X1            6                3                                                X2            2                8 A. 1/3 B. 2/3 C. 4/9 D. 5/9 4 B) Considering the following two-person zero-sum game, what percentage of the time should the column player play strategy Y1?                                                              Y1              Y2                                                X1           6                 3                                                X2           2                 8 A. 1/3 B. 2/3 C. 4/9 D. 5/9 4...
2 person zero sum game 1 -4 5 4 0 0 2 1 4 6 1...
2 person zero sum game 1 -4 5 4 0 0 2 1 4 6 1 0 Find the optimal strategies in the game represented by the matrix. Find the value of the game.
Let B = {u1,u2} where u1 = 1 0and u2 = 0 1 and B' ={...
Let B = {u1,u2} where u1 = 1 0and u2 = 0 1 and B' ={ v1 v2] where v1= 2 1 v2= -3 4 be bases for R2 find 1.the transition matrix from B′ to B 2. the transition matrix from B to B′ 3.[z]B if z = (3, −5) 4.[z]B′ by using a transition matrix 5. [z]B′ directly, that is, do not use a transition matrix.
Consider the following 2-period model U(C1,C2) = min{4C1,5C2} C1 + S = Y1 – T1 C2...
Consider the following 2-period model U(C1,C2) = min{4C1,5C2} C1 + S = Y1 – T1 C2 = Y2 – T2 + (1+r)S Where C1 : first period consumption C2 : second period consumption S : first period saving Y1 = 20 : first period income T1 = 5 : first period lump-sum tax Y2 = 50 : second period income T2 = 10 : second period lump-sum tax r = 0.05 : real interest rate Find the optimal saving, S*
Consider the following two-person zero-sum game. Assume the two players have the same three strategy options....
Consider the following two-person zero-sum game. Assume the two players have the same three strategy options. The payoff table below shows the gains for Player A. Player B Player A Strategy b1 Strategy b2 Strategy b3 Strategy  a1   3 2 ?4 Strategy  a2 ?1 0   2 Strategy  a3   4 5 ?3 Is there an optimal pure strategy for this game? If so, what is it? If not, can the mixed-strategy probabilities be found algebraically? What is the value of the game?
Consider the following two-person zero-sum game. Assume the two players have the same two strategy options....
Consider the following two-person zero-sum game. Assume the two players have the same two strategy options. The payoff table shows the gains for Player A. Player B Player A strategy b1 strategy b2 strategy a1 3 9 Strategy a2 6 2 Determine the optimal strategy for each player. What is the value of the game?
Question 6 Suppose u and v are vectors in 3–space where u = (u1, u2, u3)...
Question 6 Suppose u and v are vectors in 3–space where u = (u1, u2, u3) and v = (v1, v2, v3). Evaluate u × v × u and v × u × u.
solve the two person zero sum game with the payoff matrix: -1 -1/2 1/2 1 4/3...
solve the two person zero sum game with the payoff matrix: -1 -1/2 1/2 1 4/3 1 -2/3 -1
ADVERTISEMENT
Need Online Homework Help?

Get Answers For Free
Most questions answered within 1 hours.

Ask a Question
ADVERTISEMENT