(Static Cournot Model) In Long Island there are two suppliers of distilled water, labeled firm 1 and firm 2. Distilled water is considered to be a homogenous good. Let p denote the price per gallon, q1 quantity sold by firm 1, and q2 the quantity sold by firm 2. Firm 1 bears the production cost of c1 = 4, and firm 2 bears c2 = 2 per one gallon of water. Long Island’s inverse demand function for distilled water is given by ? = 10 − 1 4 ? where Q = q1 + q2 denotes the aggregate industry supply of distilled water in Long Island. Solve the following problems: (a) Suppose the firms compete in quantities (production levels). Compute each firm’s quantity best response function and conclude how much each firm produces in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium.(b) Compute the price and the profit of each firm in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
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