Question

Suppose that two companies – A and B – are selling an identical product in the...

Suppose that two companies – A and B – are selling an identical product in the same market.

The market demand is thus determined as:

            P = f(QA, QB) = 100 – 2QA – QB

The total costs for A and B are respectively defined as:

            TCA = 10 + 5QA +QA2

            TCB = 20 – 5QB + QB2

Solve for the Cournot Model and the Cartel Model based on the information given above and fill in the table below:

Points per box

Cournot Model Solution

Cartel Model Solution

QA

3

QB

3

QTOTAL

1

Profit of A (πA)

2

Profit of B (πB)

2

Total Profit (πAB)

1

Price charged (P)

1

Part B.

Explain the differences between the Cournot model and the Carte model, based on the information presented in the above table.

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