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Two firms have combined demand given by Q=100-2P. Their same total costs are given by TCi=2Qi+Qi^2....

Two firms have combined demand given by Q=100-2P. Their same total costs are given by TCi=2Qi+Qi^2. If they can't successfully collude and instead produce where the market price equals marginal cost, the market price will be?

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