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Raspberry and Sany are two cellphones producers. The total demand for Raspberry's cellphones is given by...

Raspberry and Sany are two cellphones producers. The total demand for Raspberry's cellphones is given by ??(??,??)=200−2??+??QR(PR,PS)=200−2PR+PS and Sany's cellphones demand is given by ??(??,??)=300−??+??4QS(PS,PR)=300−PS+PR4. Both firms have a cost of production given by ?(?)=40?C(q)=40q where ?q is the total amount of firms produced by one firm. Find the Bertrand equilibrium of the cellphones market.

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