Question

Two identical firms compete as a Cournet duopoly. The inverse market demand they face is P...

Two identical firms compete as a Cournet duopoly.

The inverse market demand they face is P = 15 – 2Q.

The cost function for each firm is C(q) = 6Q.

Each firm will earn equilibrium profits of

Business   Economics   
0 0
Add a commentTranscribed image text
Next >

Homework Answers

Answer #1

0 0
Know the answer?
Your Answer:

Post as a guest

Your Name:

What's your source?

Earn Coins

Coins can be redeemed for fabulous gifts.

Log In

Sign Up

Not the answer you're looking for?
Ask your own homework help question
Similar Questions
Two identical firms compete as a Cournot duopoly. The inverse market demand they face is P...
Two identical firms compete as a Cournot duopoly. The inverse market demand they face is P = 128 - 4Q. The cost function for each firm is C(Q) = 8Q. The price charged in this market will be a. $32. b. $48. c. $12. d. $56.
Two firms compete as a Stackelberg duopoly. Firm 1 is the market leader. The inverse market...
Two firms compete as a Stackelberg duopoly. Firm 1 is the market leader. The inverse market demand they face is P = 62 - 2Q, where Q=Q1+Q2. The cost function for each firm is C(Q) = 6Q. Given that firm 2's reaction function is given by Q2 = 14 - 0.5Q1, the optimal outputs of the two firms are: a. QL = 9.33; QF = 9.33. b. QL = 14; QF = 7. c. QL = 6; QF = 3....
Two firms compete in a market with inverse demand P = 120 − Q. Firm 1...
Two firms compete in a market with inverse demand P = 120 − Q. Firm 1 has cost function C(q1) = 20q1 and Firm 2 has cost function C(q2) = 10q2. Solve for the Bertrand equilibrium in which firms choose price simultaneously.
Two firms, a and b, compete in a market to sell homogeneous products with inverse demand...
Two firms, a and b, compete in a market to sell homogeneous products with inverse demand function P = 400 – 2Q where Q = Qa + Qb. Firm a has the cost function Ca = 100 + 15Qa and firm b has the cost function Cb = 100 + 15Qb. Use this information to compare the output levels, price, and profits in settings characterized by the following markets: a, Cournot b, Stackelberg c, Bertrand d, Collusion
Two firms, a and b, compete in a market to sell homogeneous products with inverse demand...
Two firms, a and b, compete in a market to sell homogeneous products with inverse demand function P = 400 – 2Q where Q = Qa + Qb. Firm a has the cost function Ca = 100 + 15Qa and firm b has the cost function Cb = 100 + 15Qb. Use this information to compare the output levels, price and profits in settings characterized by the following markets: Cournot Stackelberg Bertrand Collusion
Consider two identical firms competing in a market described by: • (Inverse) Demand: P = 50...
Consider two identical firms competing in a market described by: • (Inverse) Demand: P = 50 − Q , where Q = q1 + q2 • Cost Firm 1: C1 = 20q1 +q1^2 • Cost Firm 2: C2 = 20q2 + q2^2 a. (1 point) What is firm 1’s marginal cost? Firm 2’s marginal cost? What can you observe about these two firms? b.(2 points) What are the equilibrium price (P∗), production quantities (q∗1,q∗2), and profits(π∗1,π∗2), if these firms are...
Four firms compete a la Cournot in a market where inverse demand is given by P...
Four firms compete a la Cournot in a market where inverse demand is given by P = 90 − 2Q. Suppose 3 high-cost firms have constant marginal cost of 20, while one low-cost firm has marginal cost of 10. Find the Nash equilibrium output for each firm where the high-cost firms each produce the same level of output.
In a duopoly market with two identical firms, the market demand curve is: P=95-5Q And the...
In a duopoly market with two identical firms, the market demand curve is: P=95-5Q And the marginal cost and average cost of each firm is constant: AC=MC=5 If each firm sets quantity at the same time: Now assume that firm 1 in this market gets to act first (Stackelberg model). A) How much will firm 1 produce? B) How much will firm 2 produce? C) What will be the total Q and market P for this market? D) What is...
Consider two identical firms competing in a market described by: • (Inverse) Demand: P = 50...
Consider two identical firms competing in a market described by: • (Inverse) Demand: P = 50 − Q , where Q = q1 + q2 • Cost Firm 1: C1 = 20q1 +q1^2 • Cost Firm 2: C2 = 20q2 + q2^2 a. (1 point) What is firm 1’s marginal cost? Firm 2’s marginal cost? What can you observe about these two firms? b.(2 points) What are the equilibrium price (P∗), production quantities (q∗1,q∗2), and profits(π∗1,π∗2), if these firms are...
Two firms compete in a Bertrand setting for homogeneous products. The market demand curve is given...
Two firms compete in a Bertrand setting for homogeneous products. The market demand curve is given by Q = 100 – P, where Q is quantity demanded and P is price. The cost function for firm 1 is given by C(Q) = 10Q and the cost function for firm 2 is given by C(Q) = 4Q. What is the Nash-Equilibrium price? What are the profits for each firm in equilibrium?
ADVERTISEMENT
Need Online Homework Help?

Get Answers For Free
Most questions answered within 1 hours.

Ask a Question
ADVERTISEMENT